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The geographical impact of climate change on statehood is rather clear. Ever since
scientists have been warning about climate change and the rise in sea levels it
would involve, several small island nations have been at the center of a discussion
involving in situ adaptation, possible cross-border migration, and statehood. Indeed,
the future of states such as Tuvalu, Kiribati or the Maldives poses a challenge to the
traditional concept of state in that to maintain their existence as states, the formal
need for a territory and population might need to be relaxed, if this is possible at all.
This new problem has generated an active scholarly discussion, bolstered by the
unprecedented nature of such a situation.
From that discussion has emerged the idea of stretching traditional statehood
to include a new type of de-territorialized states, whose existence would not rely
on the traditional requirements of statehood. However, the existence of a state
beyond its physical roots (at least as they are usually conceived) poses a number
of challenges to the monolithic conception of the state. Such a de-territorialized
state’s prerogatives would be limited in practice, and it is uncertain how it would
function. However, were this option to become reality, an ex situ state would
effectively become a type of hybrid, somewhere between a non-state actor and a
sovereign state. While perhaps seemingly novel, there are some examples of such
entities inhabiting the grey zone between statehood and non-state actor, the most
cited being the Sovereign Military Order of Malta. A relic of the times of yore, the
Order of Malta enjoys some of the prerogatives usually reserved for states such as
diplomatic immunity or the ability to maintain diplomatic ties with most members of
the international community. Crucially however, the Order of Malta does not claim to
be a fully-fledged state, thus avoiding the intense scrutiny that comes with statehood.
How would an entity permeable to some of the same criticism addressed to
non-state actors, concerning legitimacy or accountability for instance, face that
criticism? This would be particularly interesting to consider, taking into account
that such a de-territorialized state would most likely retain its membership in most
major international law-making forums, including the United Nations. Arguably,
even though its role would be primarily advocacy on behalf of its citizens, a de-
territorialized state could still enjoy the “general” legal personality enjoyed by states.
Effectively, if the attempts of a small island state to maintain its continued statehood
beyond physical disappearance succeed, it would blur the outer limits of statehood.
Thus, if even the requirements to act as a traditional gatekeeper of international
action are loosened, could non-state actors take advantage and argue their way to
statehood, the holy grail of international legal personality?
While climate catastrophe questions our conceptions of the role of territory for
statehood, and its relationship to a population, the debate on states as subjects of
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international law takes another twist when approached from a ‘systemic perspective’.
Crises often produce turning points in governance and law. Climate change is no
exception in this respect, as the complexity of the problem has made international
environmental law adopt flexible and informal shapes. This is not a feature only of
environmental law, but taps into a broader discussion of the stagnation of formal
international law, with a corresponding pluralization and increase in informal
international lawmaking. Formal standard-setting processes are not seen to allow
for the necessary width of participation in complex problem solving, nor for smooth
adjustment in light of changing circumstances, leaving formally binding law the
role rather of “orchestrating” rather than “regulating” international action. It is
probably safe to say that regulatory pluralism is particularly tangible in international
environmental law.
The 2009 UN Climate Conference is often mentioned as a turning point for global
climate politics towards a decentralized climate policy architecture. Ever since,
climate change governance has been characterized by experiments. These
experiments have been of some importance for the role of states. Along with the
rise of ‘private spheres of authority’, also new paradigms of representation and
decision-making have emerged. Even in bodies of more traditional design, the role
of state consent in decision-making may, even at best, only be implicit, whereas
the outcomes can be tangible. All of this adds up to an erosion of the competence
and authority of states in climate governance. Whereas in 1949 the ICJ founded
the autonomy of international organizations on the consent of states, these more
recent developments suggest that states may not be needed for organizations to
enjoy institutional autonomy after all. If there ever was any intrinsic constraint against
the recognition of entities other than states or intergovernmental organizations
as subjects of international law, some authors claim that at least now the very
conception of what it means to be a subject of international law, can and should be
revised. And if the authority to create entities and confer powers upon them is no
longer the sole prerogative of the state, then the role of statehood as a permission to
act as gatekeeper of international action disappears.
There is some irony in the fact that it is at times of catastrophe when states are
needed the most. We can witness this in the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic
during spring 2020, as borders were closed in order to protect the health of the
population. States may also be the only actors capable of challenging some features
of climate action experiments such as ‘liberal environmentalism’. There is even more
irony in the fact that while climate change creates a need for opening statehood
for actors that do not fulfil all the criteria of the Montevideo Convention, the very
institutional system for dealing with climate change works to water down that
statehood from what it once meant.
We have all been recently reminded of the crucial protective function that states
perform. Also the discussion on redefining the contours of statehood has emerged
from the need to ensure effective performance of that function. But whereas dealing
with the pandemic has highlighted the importance of international cooperation (in
order to perform the protective function), effective climate governance seems to
require an erosion of statehood. Statehood is at a crossroads, and it is not clear if
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catastrophes will bring further dilution, or if the turmoil will result in states attempting
to regain control of international law-making. Trump’s aggressive undermining of
the WHO could set a dangerous precedent, even now that the case for increased
coordination has never been so apparent.
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